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Abstract 
eGovernment is an exciting area for applying Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT). ICT can improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the provision 
and delivery of citizen services. A critical issue for the eGovernment implementation 
is the interoperation problem among heterogeneous legacy government systems. In 
this aspect, the universal system interoperability supported by the XML-based 
wehservices technologies can be a useful component in a holistic eGovernment 
infrastructure. A key requirement of the eGovernment systems is the establishment 
and the implementation of the right access policy to the government resources. This 
in turn requires an appropriate mechanism to specify the access rules. Due to the 
nature of webservice and the specific requirements in the eGovernment context, we 
propose that a more powerful and flexible mechanism is required to express the 
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A glance at the economic statistics of a modern country reveals that a substantial 
proportion of her GDP is being spent to provide the government services. As a result, 
it is not surprised that a government is always looking for ways to make better use of 
the public resource. To this end, information technologies that have been successful 
in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector have long been 
applied in governments. At first, the use was limited to the application of office 
automation tools like word processors and spreadsheet programs to improve the 
efficiency of individual tasks. Later on, sophisticated information systems were built 
one after the other to achieve automation on a system scale. In many modern 
countries, this has resulted in digital governments with a collection of heterogeneous 
government information systems which exchange a high volume of information with 
the private sector (citizens) [Schorr & Stolfo 1997]. 
The recent rapid development of eCommerce has demonstrated how the 
advancement in data communication technology (in particular the explosion of 
Internet connections) can enable business transactions to be conducted electronically 
and in a more efficient way than the traditional business process. Given the 
successful eCommerce implementation in the private sector, we naturally develop the 
same expectations for applying data communication technology in government 
systems. eGovernment projects may be viewed as the answers to meet these 
expectations. 
In a narrow sense, eGovernment may be defined as simply the presence of 
government websites. However, to fully exploit the potential of the application of 
communication technology to improve the delivery of government services, the web-
centric definition would seem to be too restrictive. Indeed, [Jackson & Curthoys 2001] 
has pointed out that eGovernment is a transformative phenomenon that based on 
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back-office integration and shared information resources. We believe that 
eGovernment projects can cover: 
• backoffice system integration (government reengineering and back-office 
process streamlining) 
• integration of systems between different government bodies (G2G 
streamlining) 
• provision of government information and services on the web (G2C & G2B 
application) 
• provision of access to government information and services from electronic 
systems other than the web, eg a business's backend system (G2B 
application) 
As pointed out in Arcieri's article [Arcieri et al 2001], a critical issue for the 
eGovernment projects is the interoperability problem among heterogeneous legacy 
government systems. There are many research efforts to address the issue. For 
example, Bouguettaya et al [Bouguettaya et al 2001] used metadata to assist the 
navigation among goveriinieiit databases; the Energy Data Collection (EDC) project 
of the Digital Government Research Centre [Ambite et 2001] applied information 
integration technique to provide a single integrated user interface to access large 
diversified information. While these efforts alleviate the problem by providing 
intelligence to hide the underlying heterogeneity of the databases from the user, a 
more general solution to the problem requires effective tools and methodologies to 
provide easy and seamless connections between systems that were developed by 
different people, running in different environments and under different 
software/hardware platforms. Although there have been a whole family of distributed 
computing solutions developed by different software vendors and standard bodies, 
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none has received sufficient acceptance to ensure that eGovernment systems building 
upon which can achieve universal interoperability. 
In this aspect, the webservices technology is probable a breakthrough in the area 
of system integration. Building upon XML, which is a truly platform-neutral 
technology, the webservices interoperability standards are quickly accepted by the 
major software industry vendors. For the first time in the software history, we now 
have the core technologies that promise to achieve universal software interoperability 
on the Internet. As a tool to solve the interoperability problem, it is not difficult to see 
that the Web-Services technologies can serve as a useful component in eGovernment. 
Since the expectations on and the nature of the organisations in the public sector 
and private sector are different, there are different requirements on eGovernment 
projects as compared with the eCommerce projects. As such, application of 
webservices in the eGovernment environment should merit a study on its own. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the application of the webservices 
technologies in an eGovernment context is a subject still largely untouched. It is the 
primary objective of this paper to explore how we can incorporate the webservices 
models in the eGovernment infrastructure. 
Due to the dependency of citizen on government services, eGovernment must be 
highly trustworthy. According to an eGovernment survey conducted by Taylor 
Nelson Sofres [Taylor Nelson Sofi.es 2001], security is a major concern of most 
potential users of the eGovernment services. We believe that the enforcement of the 
appropriate access policy is an essential prerequisite of any eGovernment solution, 
including the webservices based one. We have examined the detailed requirements 
on access control for a webservices based eGovernment based on our models. Based 
on our analysis, we conclude that the traditional access control mechanisms are 
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inadequate for the webservice based eGovernment environment. To address this 
predicament, we propose a flexible framework which is composed of two key 
components: the webservice specific access control and the subject based control. 
In what follows, we will first review the key eGovernment requirements and the 
importance of system interoperability in each of them (Section 2). We then examine 
how the webservice technologies as an effective tool for system integration can help 
to resolve the eGovernment problems (Section 3). Based on this background, we 
provide an outline of a webservice based eGovernment framework in the form of a 
few eGovernment webservices models (Section 4). 
Having established a framework to apply the webservices technologies in the 
eGovernment context, we continue to examine how the security and in particular the 
system access control should be enforced in such an environment. In Section 5，we 
examine the specific access control requirements in a webservices based 
eGovernment environment based on our eGovernment webservices models. Section 6 
is a survey on the historical researches on access control and provides an overview of 
how the general access control problem is handled. Our proposed model to tackle the 
webservices based eGovernment access control requirements is then provided in 
Section 7, followed by a corresponding implementation reference model and the 
description of a pilot implementation in Section 8. Section 9 is an evaluation of the 
proposed model. The last section of this paper concludes our study and provides 
some possible directions for further research in the area. 
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2 eGovernment Requirements 
There are a number of structural difference between the public sector and the 
private one [Traunmuller & Wimmer 2000]: 
• The legal framework plays a vital part in the government systems. 
• There is a high level of non-instrumental rationality in the public sector. 
• Usually there are many stakeholders involved in a government process, 
which requires high level of collaboration. 
In addition, there are also different expectations to the government bodies as 
compared to the private sector. In particular, Government is dealing with the well 
being of a society as a whole and there should be equal access of all its services to all 
citizens [Traunmuller & Wimmer 2000]. This provides a strong justification for the 
implementations of eGovernment-on-the-web projects. 
We will examine the implication of these differences on the eGovernment 
requirements in the following four areas: 
• efficient operation; 
• citizen-centric government; 
• security; 
• support of eBusiness. 
2.1 Efficient Operation 
With the large magnitude of government spending in term of GDP [OECD 2002], 
all the modern governments have been under pressure to become more efficient. For 
example, the "National Performance Review" (NPR) initiative team was set up in the 
United State to create a government "that works better and costs less" [Gore 1993]. 
Moreover, the advance of information technology also raises the service expectation 
from the citizens who will no longer be willing to accept long response time to get 
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their service requests processed. Reduction of the processing cost and time of 
government services is thus an important objective of eGovernment. 
At the very least, eGovernment or digital government can enhance the efficiency 
of the public sector by automating of labour intensive government processes. 
However, a more significant efficiency and productivity gain is usually achievable 
when a fundamental redesign of the processes is done together with a new system, 
effectively a reengineering of the government using information technology 
[Mechling 1994]. This may also involve backoff!ce integration within the 
government body to eliminate the manual transmittal of data between system 
components. 
Both the process reengineering and backoffice integration stops at the boundary 
of the individual government departments. However, there are large number of 
government processes which require collaboration among different departments, in a 
way similar to the "interorganisational workflow" [Wil 2000] in the private sector. 
Hence, this offers ample opportunities for another level of streamlining and process 
reengineering beyond a single government body. 
The recent SARS disease outbreak in Hong Kong does offer a good example to 
demonstrate the important of information sharing across the government departments. 
The task to fight against the disease involved different tasks including the hospital 
treatment for the infected, the trace of infection source, the quarantine of the potential 
infected, public education and the release of latest statistics of the disease to the 
public. Each of these tasks may be the responsibility of one government department 
or jointly by several departments. The effort of each department must however be 
well coordinated to achieve the desired result. For example, the trace of infection 
source was based on the information of patient obtained from the hospital treatment 
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and any new reported SARS case should initiate a trace. In this case, it would be very 
useful if the systems of the responsible departments can exchange the information 
automatically to fit in a workflow. As another example, during the critical period, the 
government of Hong Kong was expected to release the latest statistics of the disease 
to the public every day. This required the collection of the data from the individual 
hospitals receiving SARS patients. The ability to extract the data from the systems of 
the hospital directly would make it possible to automate the entire task and certainly 
improve the efficiency of the reporting significantly. 
In addition, as observed by Virili [Virili 2001] a large source of government 
inefficiency exists simply because the database systems of government branches are 
implemented independently. As a result, citizen data is distributed and often 
duplicated among these databases and there is no easy way to get a consistent view of 
the citizen's data across the departments. 
Without the technology to achieve interoperation between the systems, inter-
department or G2G (Government-To-Government) streamlining is difficult to achieve. 
We can thus see that wehservices as an integration tool will have great value in 
facilitating the streamlining of G2G processes. To a less extent, the technology is also 
valuable in the intradepartment process reengineering exercise as a tool for backoffice 
integration. 
2.2 Citizen-centric Government 
Unlike a private organisation, one of the government's missions is to make the 
services available to all citizens. To meet this goal, eGovernment systems are 
required to provide equal accessibility to all the citizens in an easy-to-use way. 
Putting all the government services on the web is a major step toward this end, which 
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provides around-the-clock access to the government services in any location via the 
Internet. This can be achieved in different stages [The Economist 2000]: 
• Stage 1 — using the web to post information about various departments and 
agencies. 
• Stage 2 - providing a two-way communication, allowing citizens to provide 
new information about themselves一such as a change of address一instead 
of telephoning or writing. 
• Stage 3 - allowing a formal, quantifiable exchange of value to take place. It 
might be renewing a licence, paying a fine or enrolling in an educational 
course. 
• Stage 4 - a portal that integrates the complete range of government services, 
and provides a path to them that is based on need and function, not on 
department or agency. A single log-on with password protection allows a 
user to get in touch with any part of government. 
In the last stage, a portal is a more preferable interface to use the government 
services. Usually the portal provides grouping of government services by "life 
events": few people visit the government sites for information surfing and citizens 
usually use eGovernment for a purpose; the "life events" grouping provides a means 
for a citizen to locate the required service quickly. 
It is clear that each subsequent stage requires integration of more legacy 
functions with the web server in a more sophisticated way and the use of webservices 
technologies should be able to simplify the work. 
The access of eGovernment using web browser is a major improvement to 
government service delivery. The expectation will however be for more means to 
access the eGovernment. Sooner or later, following a similar access pattern in 
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eCommerce services, the requirement to access the eGovernment over other 
electronic devices like smart mobile phones and PDAs will be taken for granted. In 
particular, service delivery to non-computing device like the touch-toned telephone 
handset is viewed as a way to narrow the digital divide, so that access to electronic 
government service is not limited to those PC-literates. Without the webservices 
technologies to achieve universal interoperability, the connection of the legacy 
government systems to all these different types of devices can be a daunting task 
requiring tedious case-by-case integration efforts. 
The term "joined-up government" is sometimes used to describe a holistic 
government structure, in which the citizens requiring government services does not 
need to care about which department does what. One example of such vision can be 
found ill the Italian e-Government action plan [Virili 2001]: 
• Any authorised "front office" administration should supply any service to 
any entitled citizen; 
• After being identified, the citizen should not be requested to furnish any 
personal information already in procession by another administration; 
• Citizens should communicate any changes of their personal information 
only once. 
For a truly citizen-centric eGovernment, the joined-up government should be an 
important goal to achieve. It is easy to see that the achievement of joined-up 
government would require high level and seamless integration among the government 
systems. 
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2.3 Security 
Due to the dependency of citizen on government services, eGovernment is 
expected to be highly trustworthy. This demands strong security built in the 
eGovernment systems. Specifically, the requirements are: 
• confidentiality - the government resources (information and services) can 
only be accessible (retrieval and update) to authorised personnel; 
• integrity - the eGovernment information/services provided must be 
complete and accurate; 
• availability - the eGovernment services should be available to the citizens 
at time of need and must be free from unscheduled down time. 
Some may argue that there is a fourth requirement - there must be adequate audit 
trail of all activities accessing the government resources. We however view this need 
for traceability just as a means to achieve the confidential, integrity and availability 
requirements and thus will not treat it as a separate requirement. 
2.3.1 Confidentiality 
The development of digital government inevitably puts most of the citizen's 
personal data available in digital form, in one or more government system databases. 
eGovernment is about the sharing of information resources and the delivery of 
government information services over the Internet. Without an adequate protection 
for access of the eGovernment services, we will run the risk of uncontrolled exposure 
of sensitive citizen data and violating the data privacy requirements. 
While there have been a lot of technical security solutions available, the issue of 
eGovernment security is more a problem to define the appropriate access policy. This 
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is a non-trivial task that should take into consideration a number of non-technical 
factors like trust, legal issues, privacy, etc [Wimmer & Bredow 2001]. 
In general, the eGovernment access policy should achieve the protection of 
citizens' personal information privacy [Henderson & Snyder 1999]. This can be a 
very tricky requirement however as there may be an inherent conflict with the other 
eGovernment expectations, namely: 
• personalisation of eGovernment services; 
• integrated eGovernment. 
To achieve personalisation of services, ie to give a customised experience of the 
eGovernment to each user that is appropriate to the individual, will necessitate the 
profiling of the user. The will however allow the system to identify the person in 
each access. For those who are concerned with data privacy, the possibility for a 
database to be built up on the access pattern of each citizen which can be used for data 
surveillance is simply unacceptable. 
We can thus see that the challenge is to have appropriate models for user 
identification and authentication. Specifically, users should be provided with a range 
of choices over how much data they are willing to provide, in exchange to a more 
powerful and efficient service. In one extreme, the user can decide to use a common 
global digital ID to achieve a one-stop, single logon access to all eGovernment 
services, accepting that there will be a larger exposure of his/her access pattern. At 
the other end of the spectrum, anonymous access should be allowed as far as possible, 
and user authentication based on a separate digital identity for each application should 
be supported. 
The implementation of an integrated eGovernment is another area which may 
conflict with the citizen's data privacy requirement, as the interconnection of 
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government systems could allow free information flow from one government 
department to the other. In some situations, there could be specific statutory 
provisions for inter-department information access，to facilitate the collaboration of 
government bodies in specific areas. Actually, government reengineering exercises 
may often encounter areas which would require new legislation of this type to remove 
legal barriers for inter-department process streamlining. In situations where the 
statutory provision is not present, the share of information would require the 
endorsement of the data owner and the streamlined and integrated version of services 
can only be provided to users who accept the disclosure. We thus see that the legal 
framework plays a very important role to resolve this type of access requirement 
conflicts. 
2.3.2 Integrity 
Government services are required for the well-beings of citizens both 
individually and as a whole and the services provided are important and sometimes 
critical to the users. System errors in eGovernment can be costly and even have 
damaging effect to the society. It can thus be argued that the need for integrity in 
eGovernment systems is much greater compared with most of the private sector 
systems. As a basic requirement, we need to ensure that the information flow in the 
eGovernment transactions is complete and accurate. 
2.3.3 Availability 
To achieve true security to access government systems, we need to protect 
against unintended interruption of the eGovernment services, whether caused by 
accident or as a result of malicious attacks. This is very important especially for 
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those government services related to the public security. Indeed, the importance of 
the government systems availability has received increasing attention recently when 
people start to think about the possible fatal consequences of breakdown in a life 
maintaining service (eg the firefighting service) during a critical moment. 
Much of the means to enhance eGovernment availability will have to do with the 
overall system infrastructure, eg a more resilient data network or more redundancy 
incorporated in the processing equipment. However, in terms of eGovernment access 
the expectation will be that a wider range of channels should be supported to provide 
mutual backup of access. In particular, wireless access to eGovernment systems will 
become more important to ensure the availability of essential services during crisis 
situations. This will require the connection of government systems not only to the 
web browser, but also to different types of electronic devices that are capable to 
utilise the service, eg smart mobile phone, PDA device, etc. 
2.4 Support of eBusiness 
Today few governments would allow the economy to run entirely on its own. In 
fact, all the modern governments have economic policies to safeguard the economic 
well-being of society. As one of these economic goals, promotion of IT adoption is 
pursed by most governments as an opportunity to improve the living standard of the 
citizens and enhance the competitiveness of the society's economic power. For 
example, the Hong Kong SAR government has put "promoting the wider use of IT in 
the community and improving public access to online services" as part of the "Digital 
21" Strategy [HKSARITSD 2001]. 
To this end, the government has at least two roles to play. Firstly, as the 
eBusiness facilitator the government is expected to ensure that the necessary 
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infrastructure and environment is in place for electronic transactions to take place 
efficiently and securely. In particular, as the government is the provider of large 
number of services essential to the operation of every business, the efficient delivery 
of the eGovernment services is an important driver to the adoption of eCommerce. 
One way this can be done is to provide an easy mean to achieve G2B system 
integration to allow straight through consumption of eGovernment services. 
Secondly, as a major player in the economy, the government can play the role as 
a leader in adoption of new technologies. Being both an effective tool for Enterprise 
Application Integration and an inexpensive alternative to the EDI solutions to support 
exchange of information between businesses (B2B integration), the webservices 
technologies have a lot of applications in the private sector. In this aspect, successful 
applications of webservices technologies in eGovernment projects can set good 
examples on how the technologies can be used beneficially. 
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3 Webservices for e-Government - A Marriage for Interoperability 
The eGovernment systems are not the only applications that require integration 
and interoperability. Most organisations are facing with the same problem of 
integrating large number of legacy systems and solutions for Enterprise Application 
Integration (EAI) have always been in strong demand. Driven by the market, a whole 
family of distributed computing solutions have been invented over the years. This 
includes RPC from Sun, COM/DCOM from Microsoft and COBRA from the Object 
Management Group (OMG). Unfortunately, none of these products has enjoyed 
widespread acceptance and this has greatly limited the usefulness of these solutions 
for universal interoperability. As a result, integration solution providers are often 
forced to build new adapters when a new connection is required, effectively 
reinventing the wheel every time. 
The lesson learnt is that to achieve universal interoperability, we need standards 
that are both vendor neutral and supported by all vendors. With the recent emergence 
of XML, the industry has been quick to recognise its potential as the building block 
for truly language and platform neutral standards. To this end, a suite of extensible 
Markup Language (XML)-based webservices technologies [Graham et al 2001] 
[Chappell & Jewell 2002] has been evolved as the most promising solution to enable 
global system interoperation: 
• Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is an XML-based protocol for 
exchanging structured information in a decentralized, distributed 
environment. SOAP provides a "http-friendly" protocol for systems to talk 
over the Internet, to request and to serve for webservices [W3C 2000]; 
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• Web Service Description Language (WSDL) is an XML format for 
describing network services. WSDL allows the client to understand how to 
invoke a webservice [W3C 2001]; 
• Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) is a webservices 
based standard for registration and search of network services. UDDI 
provides a webservices discovery platform on the Internet [Boubez 2002]. 
As we can see from the definitions of webservices given by the major players 
(IBM [Feller], Microsoft [MSDN] [MSDN - BizTalk] and Sun [Sun 2002]), 
webservices are about providing services over the network via standard XML wire 
format. Thus, each vendor can have a different webservices architecture which is the 
most appropriate to its proprietary platform [Myerson 2002], and at the same time 
adhering to the same XML standards, which facilitates successful interoperation with 
any service consumers sticking to the same standards. In this aspect, the webservices 
technology is truly platform and vendor neutral as it allows each vendor to 
incorporate webservice support seamlessly in its platform products. 
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4 A Wehservices Based eGovernment Framework 
With the requirements in mind, we are ready to outline a webservices based 
eGovernment infrastructure. We will do that with a number of models: 
• the system component model 
• the system access model 
• the security model 
• the transaction model. 
4.1 System Component Model 
To build an eGovernment infrastructure, we need to turn the legacy government 
applications into service components that are to be deployed as webservices. Each of 
the identified webservice will be described by a WSDL document, which will be 
made available to the parties who have to use the services. 
This exercise can be done in many different ways. Specifically, we can provide 
webservices to access business services, data services or objects [Linthicum 2000]. 
However, a reasonable approach is to extract the existing business functions provided 
by the legacy system. The rationale behind this is that webservices technologies are 
about integration. It thus only makes sense to webservice-enable a software service if 
there will be demands to consume it by another software system. Based on the 
requirements we have touched upon, it is likely that we will have the following types 
of webservices: 
• internal services - this is the application of webservices technologies to 
facilitate integration of systems within a government body. For example, 
exposing the electronic filing system as webservices would allow automatic 
filing of the documents generated in the steps of processes handled by other 
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systems of the department. This type of webservices are also useful for the 
construction of the department website as the exposed department services 
can easily be connected to the web server. 
• inter-department services - this allows transactions to be conducted 
electronically between government bodies. For example, a central 
eProcurenient webservice can be provided so that the system of any 
department can submit and track procurement orders automatically. This is 
useful for inter-department (G2G) process streamlining to eliminate manual 
paper flow between government departments, as well as the implementation 
of joined-up government projects which either require connection of 
government services to portal or delivery of macro processes involving 
steps spanning across different departments. 
• public services - this allows easy consumption of eGovernment services by 
the business information systems in the private sector and is useful to 
support B2G applications. Moreover, an eGovernment webservice can be 
embedded in a business application to be provided to the citizens bundled 
with other value-added services provided by the business, eg the vehicle 
registration service can be provided by the car dealer's system to the buyer 
of a new car. 
4.2 System Access Model 
The system access model covers how the webservices will be accessed. The 
model addresses both the network environment [Coulouris et al 2001] of the service 
and the way the service is exposed to the end user. 
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The internal eGovernment webservices are perhaps the simplest ones in term of 
the access environment. The primary purpose of this webservices is to support 
backoffice integration. A deployment on the local area network (LAN) connecting 
to the other systems of the same organisation is usually sufficient for these services. 
The access to these services will be limited to trusted systems. As such, for these 
webservices, security and network performance are not major issues. The support of 
wireless device on the LAN does present some problems, however, but this can be 
circumvented by requiring all accesses from these wireless clients to go through a 
trusted component on the LAN. 
The second type of eGovernment webservices are those provided for inter-
department integration. In most countries, a government or at least state level 
intranet is available for deployment of these services eg the Unitary Network in Italy 
as described in [Mecella & Batini 2001], which should provide sufficient network 
performance and security protection for the applications. However, as we have 
discussed, access of information between government bodies is a tricky area that data 
privacy must be strictly observed. Hence, the protection offered by the physical 
security of the government intranet may not be sufficient for the more sensitive 
webservices. 
The last type of eGovernment webservices are those that need to be available to 
the general public. These will be deployed over the Internet and requires strong 
security protection similar to the eGovernment services provided on the web. Unlike 
the services provided within the government networks, the limitation of the current 
Internet in the quality of service is an important consideration for the more critical 
webservices in this category. 
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Depending on the nature of the webservice, the consumer of the webservice may 
not be the same as the end user. In case both the consumer and the end user are the 
same, the webservice can be exposed directly to the end user. Otherwise, the 
webservice can only be exposed to the end user via the consumer, which would 
probably do that by its user interface. For example, a vehicle registration 
eGovernment webservice (a B2G webservice) can be exposed to the car dealer's 
system (the consumer) which in turn provides the service to the buyer of a new car 
(the end user). As we will see, webservices exposed to the end user in this indirect 
manner poses a special issue for end user authentication, which is not present in the 
traditional web applications. 
4.3 Security Model 
The object based access model can be used to describe the webservices 
infrastructure. Under the object model [Eckel 2000], we view the eGovernment 
webservices as interfaces to which government processes (objects) encapsulating 
protected information/services can be accessed. Protection of the government 
resources is thus achieved via the protection against unauthorised access to the 
webservices, according to the right access policy. We will focus on two components 
of the access models for the eGovernment: the access right model and the 
authentication model. 
4.3.1 Access Right Model 
Depending on the nature of the webservice, there can be more than one parties 
involved in using a webservice as sometimes a service is used by an end-user different 
with the owner of the consumer process. However, as there is always a consumer 
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coming into play, it is easier to define the access level based on the consumer of the 
webservice. There are three levels of access possible: 
• the consumer has no access to the webservice; 
• the consumer has limited access to the webservice; 
• the consumer has full access to the webservice. 
For public webservices, access is effectively granted to all the consumers that 
can connect to the service via the internet. In addition, all these consumers will have 
full access to webservices offering no personal service, including the majority of 
information access or querying services. User level access right will be enforced, 
however, for the public services that involve personal information. 
Similar considerations apply to the G2G webservices. There will be a group of 
infrastructure or administration related services that all the government department 
should have full access on. For the other webservices provided on the government 
intranet, the formulation of access policy is a more complicated exercise that should 
be based on the legal framework relevant to the resources encapsulated by the 
webservice. The requirement is that access to a webservice offered by another 
department should be granted if the access to the information encapsulated is 
explicitly approved in the law; or authorisation to access the information is available 
from the citizen involved. In the latter case, only limited access should be granted 
appropriate to the authorisation received from the citizen. 
To assist the work in this area, we will need automatic tool to extract the access 
policy of government resources implied from the statute law into a form that can be 
used by the eGovernment webservices infrastructure. 
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For internal webservices offered within a government department, access policy 
can be formulated based on the organisation structure of the department, similar to 
other information resources deployed on the department LAN. 
4.3.2 Authentication Model 
The access right model is about who should do what: in the context of a 
webservice, we need to decide what authorities the consumer (maybe with or on 
behalf of an end-user) owns. Obviously this requires the identification of the 
consumer and sometimes the end-user to the webservice, which is the responsibility 
of the authentication mechanism [Oellermanii 2001]. 
Based on the access right model, there are different cases to be handled: 
• No authentication - Authentication is not required when full access of the 
webservice should be granted to all consumers that can connect to the 
service. Indeed, in this type of situation anonymous access to the 
webservice is the most appropriate access mode to achieve maximum 
privacy protection. 
• Authentication on the consumer 一 For webservices which full access is 
granted based on the identity of the consumer, we need to identify the 
consumer only. 
• Authentication on both the consumer and the end users - This is required 
both to support the access right policy requiring the end-user authorisation, 
or the use of webservice business transactions. 
The requirements are straightforward except the last one. Here the challenge is 
to authenticate someone without a direct connection, as all the information flow 
between the end-user and the webservice is routed through the consumer process. We 
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see that we have two alternatives: either we entrust the consumer in the process, or we 
require the end-user to use a client agent so that advance cryptography technique can 
be applied to supply a credential to the webservice provider. 
Ill the first alternative, we will rely on the consumer to authenticate the end-user 
without mandating the mechanism the consumer should adopt. As a result, the 
consumer can choose the most appropriate means to decide the identity of the end-
user, ranging from physical presence to the use of passwords over the Internet. This 
can provide the greatest flexibility to the end-user and is appropriate when there is a 
trusted relationship between the webservice provider and the consumer, as in the case 
of the G2G or G2B webservices. When the required trust cannot be established with 
the consumer, however, we have to rely on technologies based on digital signature 
which will nevertheless require a more sophisticated client agent and the 
establishment of a PKI in the eGovernment framework. 
Another consideration for end-user authentication is on the use of single or 
multiple digital identities. On the system point of view, the use of a single global 
digital identity for each user will allow more efficient processing of the services, 
especially for services requiring collaboration among systems from different 
government bodies. However, as discussed before the citizen user may have more 
concern over the privacy issue and would prefer to use a separate digital identity for 
each different application. 
4.4 Transaction Model 
We have seen that the webservices technology is a useful tool to implement 
integrated government services, an important element of joined-up governments. 
There is however a transactional nature of these services that we have to address in 
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the webservice infrastructure. Specifically, we need a mechanism to ensure that the 
work done by individual webservices components of the integrated service will be 
completed in a consistent state. 
The traditional distributed transaction model is based on the atomicity of 
business transactions, which means that all the steps in a transaction must be 
completed or unwound together [Harder & Reuter 1983]. To incorporate the 
capability in webservices without sacrificing the interoperability we will require 
additional webservice standards on how coordinating information can be exchange 
among webservice providers. The Business Transaction Project [OASIS 2002] is a 
piece of work to address this issue. 
Until the completion and the wide acceptance of the webservice transaction 
standards, we will have to adopt an alternative model based on compensating 
operations [Korth et al 1990]. In particular, we will need to provide a compensating 
webservice to each one that can take part in a webservices transaction. In addition, 
there should be a detection mechanism to report webservices failures, eg an end-of-
day reconciliation between the requests submitted by a consumer and that processed 
successfully by the provider. When one of the webservices in an integrated service 
failed, the appropriate compensating webservice can be used to unwind the completed 
one. As the nature of most government services does not required the enforcement of 
the transaction atomicity in real-time, this should be a practical approach to apply in 
the eGovernment context. 
We have thus outlined a webservice eGovernment framework in terms of the 
different webservices models. In what follows, we will focus and explore on the part 
of the framework that deals with the access control. 
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5 eGovernment WebServices Access Control 
To safeguard the government resources in a webservice environment, we need to 
control the accesses to the government webservices. With the control in place, 
whenever there is a request (from outside or within the government domain) to use a 
government webservice, the access will be accepted or rejected according to whether 
the requesting party is authorised to use the service. 
The access right model we have described above is to determine who should be 
allowed to access each webservice according to the access policy. With an access 
policy, we will need an access control mechanism to implement the access control 
according to "who should do what" as specified in the access policy. 
A key issue in the webservices based eGovernment system is that we need an 
infrastructure to support the access control requirement. The webservices 
technologies are to achieve interoperability between the government systems. The 
implementation of the access control at the individual departments or webservices 
level will however likely to introduce new interoperability problems which could 
defeat the whole purpose of using the technologies. 
To better understand the requirements of such a global access control mechanism, 
we will have a closer look of the following components: 
• eGovernment webservice 
• access to eGovernment webservice 
• eGovernment access policy 
5.1 eGovernment WebService 
In a webservices based eGovernment system, government services are provided 
to the users in the form of service components deployed as webservices. As we have 
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discussed in the system component model, different types of eGovernment 
webservices can be implemented to serve different purposes. These include internal 
services provided within a government body to facilitate system integration, inter-
department services provided across government departments to support inter-
department process streamlining, or delivery of citizen services requiring cross-
department processing, and public services provided to allow government services to 
be embedded in private business systems. 
In developing our security model for government webservices, we have argued 
that different access control requirements apply to each type (internal, inter-
department, public) of government webservices. For example, a public government 
service that involves citizen data access would require citizen level access right, to 
ensure that each citizen can only access his/her own data via the webservice. The 
access control mechanism should thus support authentication of the webservice user 
identity. On the other hand, a G2G webservice not involving citizen data may be 
accessible by all or selected government departments, and thus the access right would 
solely be determined by the consumer of the webservice. 
The diversity of access control requirements must be adequately addressed by 
the eGovernment access control mechanism. In particular, the mechanism must 
provide adequate flexibility to express the different types of webservice access rules 
precisely and efficiently. More important, the mechanism should be able to provide a 
level of infrastructure support such that the webservice developers do not have to 
worry about the access control. In other words, this should allow each webservice to 
be developed without any knowledge of who will and should access it. The 
webservice developer should focus on the business logic of the service; the 
mechanism to grant or reject an access request to the webservice should be the sole 
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responsibility of the access control mechanism and must not be "hardwired" in the 
webservice. The application of this "separation of concerns" [Lopes & Hurscli 1995] 
principle is to isolate and thus protect the webservice from any changes in access 
policy. Any changes in the access policy related to a webservice (eg a change of 
access right due to a reorganisation) should only affect the access control setting for 
the webservice and should require nothing more than the modification of its access 
control parameters. In what follows we will refer to the requirement to allow a 
webservice to be developed independent of the access policy as the "policy neutral" 
requirement. 
5.2 Request of Access 
The access control mechanism is responsible to determine whether each access 
request to a webservice should be accepted or rejected. In terms of the network 
environment, a webservice request can be made from a system connected to the same 
LAN as the webservice provider, a system connected to the government intranet, or 
just from the Internet. As one of the requirements, the access control mechanism 
should support access rules based on the means of access. 
To illustrate the requirement, let us look at an internal webservice that provides 
electronic filing service to other electronic processes of the same government 
department. It is likely that this webservice should be provided only to systems of the 
department which owns the electronic filing. This would translate into an access 
policy that only access requests from the department LAN should be accepted. 
Another example would be an eProcurement webservice offered by the central 
government procurement department. While this service should be offered to a much 
wider user base than the electronic filing webservice in the previous example, the 
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access should still be limited to within the government. The access policy for this 
service will have some parts tied up with a requirement that all access requests not 
from the government intranet should be rejected. 
The use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology [Scott et al 1999] to 
provide access to the LAN or government intranet makes the requirement a bit more 
complicated. As the technology can provide a secure connection over the Internet, 
VPN can be employed to provide low cost access to remote offices or staff at home. 
In effect, although the actual physical access is from the Internet, the VPN technology 
serve to hide this and the access should appear to be within the LAN or intranet for all 
security management purpose. We will take the same view and treat a VPN 
client/client system as part of the LAN or intranet connected to the VPN. The fact 
that a VPN access request comes from the Internet is irrelevant to the access control 
decision and should be transparent to the access control mechanism. 
Association of access rights based on the means of access is a useful way to 
capture the eGovernment webservice access policy. However, a more general access 
policy should have rights associated with the parties requesting for the service. This 
is ill close analog with the access control commonly employed on a time-sharing 
system, which provides access rights based on the user. To access a resource on the 
system eg a database file, a user should first request the necessary "privilege" of the 
file and subsequently all processes associated with that user will be granted access to 
the file. 
Unlike the access to an object in a time-sharing system, an access to a 
webservice can be associated with more than one parties (the equivalence of the 
"system user" in a time-sharing system). Therefore a single party based access right 
“ P ^ 28 
such as the capability list [Lampson 1969], may not be adequate to accommodate the 
right access policy. 
This can be illustrated with a webservice example. As a legal requirement in 
Hong Kong, the owner of a private car must submit his/her car for an inspection for 
roadworthiness every year starting from the seventh year after the manufacture date. 
The inspection service is outsourced to a few testing centres, who will issue a 
Certificate of Roadworthiness to the vehicle owner if the car passes the tests. The 
certificate is required for the subsequent vehicle licence renewal. Suppose that the 
process is streamlined to eliminate the physical Certificate of Roadworthiness. To 
achieve this, a webservice can be provided to the test centres to update the 
examination record of the vehicle directly. Renewal of the vehicle can then be based 
on the updated record and the certificate will no longer be needed. Such webservice 
will be accessed by the system of the test center as a consumer, acting on behalf of the 
vehicle owner as the end user. 
Since the webservice would update the vehicle record, access to the webservice 
should be granted only if the request is made on behalf of the vehicle owner. In 
addition, the service should only be accessible from the test centers, not from anyone 
on the Internet. As such, the access should be granted based on the identity of both 
the end users and the consumer. 
There are other possibilities. For instance, access right may be determined based 
on the identity of the consumer only, as in our previous example of the electronic 
filing webservice, which should serve all the systems on the same LAN. On the other 
hand, for most public citizen information enquiry webservices, eg a tax assessment 
enquiry service, it is sufficient to have end user based access right as the identity of 
the consumer is not important for the access decision. 
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A more complicated (and interesting) situation arises when a service is requested 
as a result of a chain of webservice execution. The chained webservice model is 
useful to support processes that require collaboration from different government 
departments. In this situation, when an end user initiates the process, a request will be 
made to access the first webservice on the chain. As all the subsequent webservices 
except the last one in the chain need an additional service from another department to 
fulfill its function, each will request for another webservice along the chain, until the 
end of the chain is reached which will be a webservice that can completed on its own. 
In term of the access right, we should view each access request as made jointly by the 
owner systems of the webservices on the chain preceding that webservice. If the 
webservice is accessible by any one or more of these systems, the access should be 
accepted. In other words, we should combine the access rights of all the consumer 
systems when there are more than one consumers involved in an access request. 
Obviously, the eGovernment webservice access control mechanism must be able 
to accommodate each of these situations as part of its overall requirements. 
5.3 eGovernment Access Policy 
As a useful analogy, an access control mechanism for a webservice is like a 
security guard for a restricted area: while the security guard determines who should be 
admitted through the gate, the access control mechanism should determine which 
access request to the webservice should be accepted. To fulfil this responsibility, the 
security guard needs to know beforehand the list of people who should be admitted. 
Without such a list even the most experienced security guard cannot be expected to 
make the access control decision correctly. To complete the analogy, a similar list is 
required for the access control mechanism, which is the access policy in the form of 
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the criteria for acceptance or rejection of each webservice access. The responsibility 
of the access control mechanism is to enforce the access policy of the webservice. 
The data access policy for the systems of any modem governments is inherently 
a complicated subject. Firstly, the size of the problem is huge in terms of the number 
of potential users (including all citizen, civil servants and government departments) 
and the number of government systems. Also, government systems and databases are 
largely developed independently of one another usually with little consideration for 
security interoperability. As a result, it is likely that significant effort needs to taken 
to tackle the problems of semantic heterogeneity and conflicting security policies in 
the different government domains [Joshi et al 2002] to work out a government access 
policy on a global basis. 
Perhaps not as a surprise, the adoption of a webservice eGovernment 
infrastructure, the primary objective of which is to solve the general interoperability 
issues of eGovernment projects, also helps to resolve the security interoperability 
problem. This is because, by extracting into webservice components only those 
existing business functions provided by the legacy system, a webservice based 
eGovernment system can be viewed as a group of business objects accessible by 
potential users and systems and the access to information resources are though the 
well-defined webservice interfaces. This eGovernment webservices component 
model offers a simpler conceptual model for the data access, as compared with the 
interconnected heterogeneous federal system model, which makes it much easier to 
tackle the security interoperability problems. Let us examine how the webservice 
access policy should look like in our webservices framework. 
“ Page 31 
Property Administration Based Policy Legislation Based Policy 
Source Administration Decision Legal Framework 
Scope Within Service Provider Across the whole Government 
Subject Specific Webservice Legal Subjects 
Right For General or Specific User General User or Specific 
Government Bodies (Not 
Specific Individual User) 
Conflicting Not Possible Possible 
Policies 
Open Policy Not In General Yes 
Table 5.3: Property of eGovernment Access Policy 
5.3.1 Administration Based Policy 
Based on our webservice access right model, it is useful to distinguish between 
two types of webservice access policies. The first type covers those access rules that 
are based on administrative arrangements at a department level. Most of the access 
rules for the internal webservices fall in this category as the access to these 
webservices should be formulated based on the organisation structure of the 
webservice owner department. Also, administration based access rules may be 
derived from explicit arrangements (eg in the form of a legal contract or inter-
department agreement) between the webservice provider and another party to provide 
the business service to that party. For example, if the transport department may have 
an outsourcing agreement to subcontract the vehicle inspection service to a private 
operated testing centre, the testing centre should be granted with the access right to 
the appropriate vehicle record update webservice as a consumer, on behalf of the 
vehicle owner. Lastly, this type of policy also applies to the infrastructure or 
administration related webservices as the right to access the services is covered by the 
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service level agreement (also known as performance pledge in Hong Kong) 
committed by the service department. 
The above examples reveal a few properties of the administration based access 
policy. Firstly, it is to deal with the webservice specific access as the access right is 
based on the service to be provided to the potential consumers/users. Therefore, we 
will have specific access rules for each webservice. Secondly, security 
interoperability is not an issue here, as all the access decisions can be made within the 
department, either based on the organisation or explicit agreements with outsider. 
Lastly, there is no mandatory need to disclose the access policy in force to parties 
outside the department. In some cases, the disclosure is actually undesirable as it will 
reveal some sensitive organisational information of or confidential arrangements 
made by the service department. Therefore, it is more appropriate to handle the 
administration based access policy within the service department. 
5.3.2 Legislation Based Policy 
Administration based access policy is not adequate when the provider of the 
webservice does not have the authority to decide all the access rights. In this case, we 
need a source of access policy that can be applied in the global government level. 
This is when the legislation based access policy comes into play. It is a norm in 
modern governments that a comprehensive legal framework should be in place to 
provide the legal basis for all government activities, and in particular the interaction 
between government bodies and the citizen or among different government bodies. 
The formulation of access policy beyond the provider's domain can and should thus 
be based on the legislation relevant to the government service provided. 
In the webservice environment, the legislation based access policy dictates 
access right to a webservice if the access by the user to the business service offered or 
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the information resources encapsulated by the webservice is explicitly approved by 
the law. The law does not however specify the access right in the form of 
webservices. Instead, the security subjects (the business service/information 
resources) are described by legal terms in the relevant pieces of legislation. As such, 
legislation based access policy is based on the legal subjects and specifies who can 
access these subjects. The full set of legislation based access policy can thus be 
viewed as a set of the legal subjects and the authorised parties to access each of them. 
It is thus important for any access control mechanism to support an easy translation of 
the access rule from the policy extracted from government rule books or statutory 
documents. 
To apply the policy by a webservice access control mechanism, a mapping 
between the security subjects and the legal subjects is necessary. This mapping can 
be a many-to-many one, which means that multiply legal rules can apply to a single 
webservice, and one rule can apply to more than one webservices. 
The task of working out the mapping for all security subjects is a complicated 
task requiring significant efforts from both technical and legal experts. In our 
component model, however, eGovernment webservices should be based on existing 
business services and it is likely that the provider of each webservice is familiar with 
the relevant legislatures and thus the legal subjects that should apply to the underlying 
business service. As such, it is unnecessary to work out the mapping from the scratch. 
This is certainly an advantage of the webservice based eGovernment structure. 
The task is less straightforward when a webservice is introduced for a new 
business service. In this case, the most difficult part of the task is to locate the 
relevant statutory applicable to the service. In reality, however, most government 
departments are established based on a well-defined piece of legislation. For example, 
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the Inland Revenue Department and Company Registrar of Hong Kong are based on 
the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Chapter 112 of Laws of Hong Kong) and the 
Companies Ordinance (Chapter 32 of Laws of Hong Kong), respectively. It is highly 
probable that the relevant legal subjects of the services provided by a department are 
covered in the corresponding legislation, e.g. the submission of tax return to the 
Inland Revenue Department is covered in Part IX of the Inland Revenue Ordinance. 
Accordingly, if a webservice is to be set up for tax return submission, each citizen 
should have the access right to submit his/her own return. 
The legal framework does not only provide an authoritative source for access 
policy. It also provides a common vocabulary to describe the security subjects and 
thus serves to resolve the problem of semantic heterogeneity in different 
eGovernment domains. In addition, provided that the legal framework is reasonably 
well integrated and self-consistent, the chance of conflicting security policies derived 
is minimal (Nevertheless, there is still a need to resolve the possible inconsistency 
within the legal framework and we will return to this point later). 
The legal subject referred to in a legislation based access rule may either be 
specific or general. The power to obtain the tax return is an example of a rule with a 
specific subject. Another example can be found in the Land Registration Regulations 
of Hong Kong (Chapter 128A of Law of Hong Kong) which stipulates in section 4 
that the "Land Registry" should be open to the public. 
All example for the general legal subject can be found in Hong Kong's Personal 
Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Chapter 486 of Law of Hong Kong) which spells out the 
access right for all "personal data" as any data that "relating directly or indirectly to a 
living individual and from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to 
be directly or indirectly ascertained and in a form in which access to or processing of 
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the data is practicable" [HKSAR 1996]. The rule is that the “data subject" of the each 
piece of personal data should be allowed to access the data. As such, any webservices 
encapsulating personal data should be granted with access to the subject of the data. 
This clearly applies to a large range of government services. 
A similar example can be found in the Official Secrets Ordinance of Hong Kong 
(Chapter 521 of Law of Hong Kong) which covers sensitive information relating to 
security, intelligence and criminal investigation. In effect, no access to these data 
from anybody should be allowed other than those working directly with the data as 
part of their duty. 
Normally, the law provides right to access to the general public (the "Land 
Registry" example), the data subject of the service (the "Personal Data" example), or 
a specific government body. The right of a tax assessor of the Inland Revenue 
Department in Hong Kong to obtain all tax related information of a citizen as 
stipulated in section 51 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Chapter 112 of Law of 
Hong Kong) is an example of the right provided to a specific government body. 
Unlike the administration based policy, the legislation based policy never spells out 
right to individual service users. This is an important observation which we will rely 
on later in our proposed access control mechanism. 
Another interesting point is that there can be more than one source of access 
policies applying to the same legal subject. This will result in conflicting access rules 
applied to the same webservice. This is actually the result of inconsistent legislation 
and there is no easy way to resolve other than the request for a court decision. 
Nevertheless, for legal system which provides a hierarchical legislation structure (for 
example, the US Constitution takes precedence over all other forms of law in the 
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state), some priority system can be adopted and this should be catered in the access 
control mechanism. 
It is worthwhile to point out that legislation based access policy is not something 
new that is invented for the webservice based eGovernment structure. The legal 
framework is a key part of any modern government infrastructure and there must be 
an element of the legislation based access policy in any eGovernment structures. 
However, as illustrated above, the eGovernment webservices component model, 
which views each webservice as a well-defined interface to the security subjects, 
makes it easy to utilize this type of access policy, 
A summary of the two different types of eGovernment access policy is given in 
Table 5.3. Due to the different natures, it is more appropriate to handle each of these 
access policies in a different way. However, when both types of policies apply to the 
same webservice, we can refer to the webservice specific (administration based) rules 
first which is set up by the service provider. If the rules cannot determine whether an 
access request should be accepted or not, the subject (legislation based) rules can then 
be consulted. 
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6 Research in Access Control 
This section provides a review of the existing work on access control. Each 
study will be briefly described and examined in the context of the applicability to the 
webserviced based eGovernment environment. 
6.1 Traditional Model 
Our study of the traditional model is based on the paper from Lampson 
[Lampson 1971]. 
The traditional access control mechanism can be modelled by an object system 
with three components: a set of objects X, a set of domains D and an access matrix A, 
which contains a row for every domain d and a column for every object x. Objects are 
the things to protect, which can include program and data files. The domains related 
to the process execution environments with distinct access rights. The domain 
concept can cover ideas like user profile and other protection contexts. 
An authorization is specified by a triple <d, x, p> to state that the domain d is 
authorized to exercise privilege p on object x. To set up the authorisation, the value of 
p will be stored in the access matrix A in the row and column corresponding to the 
domain/object, ie Adx. Access right decision can be made by looking up of the 
corresponding entry is the matrix. 
Some popular implementations of the access matrix will keep the authorization 
as a list of capability for each domain d which is the dth. column of the matrix. 
Alternatively, an access control list may be kept for each object x, which is the xth 
row of the matrix. Both serve to simplify the task of maintaining and accessing the 
potential large but sparse access matrix. 
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The access matrix is a fairly low level mechanism which maps directly to the 
concepts in a distributed operating systems. This is a great advantage as 
implementation of access matrix can be easily accommodated in an operating system. 
The model however does not take into consideration of the business access policy and 
thus it has to rely on the security administrator to translate the access policy into the 
access matrix. This can be a formidable task, particularly in a webservice based 
eGovernment environment. 
For example, the concept of domain, while useful in an operating system context, 
is too primitive to handle the access to webservices. Here we need a mechanism that 
provide abstraction to cater for the access right based on combination of environment 
factors including physical means of access, identity of the user and identify of 
consumer. In addition, the object concept requires all authorization to be expressed 
based on the operating system objects is also too restrictive to cater for the 
requirement of the legislation based access policy, which is based on the legal 
subjects instead of physical information resources. 
6.2 More Advanced Models 
6.2.1 Role-Based Access Control Model 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a generalized access control model that 
provides many advantages over the traditional model. Our study is based on the paper 
from Ferraiolo and Kuhn [Ferraiolo & Kuhn 1992]. 
The concept of RBAC is based on the fact that access decisions in an 
organization are often based on the roles individual users take on within the 
organization. To apply this concept, a RBAC mechanism defines access rights to the 
information resources by well-defined roles. The basic scheme consists of three 
components: a set of well defined roles R, a set of subjects S and a set of transactions 
“ P ^ 39 
T. The subject set S corresponding to the users of the protected system and is similar 
to the concept of domain in the traditional model. Each transaction t represents a 
transformation procedure on specific information resources. In the RBAC model, 
access decision is based on transactions, ie access right is expressed as whether a 
subject can execute a transaction. The incorporation of transaction in the model is to 
capture the same transaction concept in business system as a convenient base for 
assigning authorisation, although the model can easily be extend to cover access right 
based on objects. 
Specifically: 
• a subject s is authorized to perform one or more roles in the set RA{s); 
• a subject s can invoke one of the roles in RA{s) as its active role AR{s)\ 
• a role r can be authorised to perform one or more transactions in the set 
TA{r); 
When an access decision is required to determine whether subject s can execute 
transaction t, the system will check wither the active role of s, ie AR(s) is authorized 
to perform t. More formally the access should be accepted if (eTA(AR{s)), and 
rejected \it^TA{AR{s)). 
Authorisation is thus based on the roles and the access right set up involve two 
steps: specification of transactions for each role, and the assignment of members to 
the role, which are implemented by putting values in the set TA and RA respectively. 
Role is a useful concept within a well-defined organisation structure when every 
member has clear and specific responsibility based roles assigned. As such RBAC is 
a powerful and flexible model to express the access policy of most business 
organisations. 
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To apply the RBAC in the government environment in a way that security 
interoperability can be achieved, however, would involve the set up of global roles 
that can be assigned across government domains. While it is possible to define some 
general roles (eg *GOVERNMENT and ^CITIZEN as defined in our proposed model 
in the next section), a comprehensive role structure is not immediately available. In 
fact, the legislation framework which is our source for global government access 
policy does not seem to provide a convenient way to support this task. Unless an 
alternative means is available to provide the basis of the global role set up, it is 
difficult to apply RBAC in the eGovernment environment. 
The role concept has the same limitations as the domain concept to address the 
need to cater for the access right based on combination of environment factors 
including physical means of access, identity of the user and identify of consumer. 
Lastly, we observe that there is a parallel between the RBAC transaction concept 
and the concept of webservice. In our webservice model, each eGovernment 
webservice can be viewed as an object that provides a service via operations on 
protected information/services. Protection of the government resources via the 
protection against unauthorised access to the webservices is thus a similar concept to 
set up of authorization based on transaction. Furthermore, if we assign an implicit 
role to each webservice (ie one unique role for each webservice), our proposed access 
control model can be viewed as providing a solution to assign the membership to 
these roles. 
6.2.2 Task-Based Authorisation Control Models 
The Task Based Authorisation Control (TBAC) family of models is proposed in 
Thomas and Sandhu's paper [Thomas & Sandhu 1997] to address the access control 
requirement in workflow-based processing. The authors argue that in such a 
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environment, permissions to access protected resources should be controlled and 
managed in such a way that they are turned-on only in a just-in-time fashion, 
according to the progress of the processing task. 
In the TBAC models, authorization is granted and controlled via authorization-
step. To obtain access to a protected resource, a process need to invoke the 
appropriate authorization step, which can be granted from a number of pre-defined 
trustees of the authorization step. A key feature of the models is that there is a life-
time associated with each invoked authorization step, based on either usage or time 
parameter. TBAC also allows interrelationships to be defined between authorization 
steps in the form of dependencies. 
There is still a lot of work required before TBAC can be applied to a real world 
problem like the eGovernment enviornment. For examples, a formal means is needed 
to specify the access policy according to the models. 
In term of the webservice environment, our proposed system will capture one of 
the key properties of the TBAC models: just in time authorisation. This happens in 
application of the eGovernment webservices to implement cross-domain workflow. 
As access control decision in our model is made on the basis of the individual 
webservice, the required access right to the protected resources required for a service 
will only be available within the webservice. Upon the completion of a workflow 
step and control passed to the subsequent webservice, the access right will no longer 
be valid and effectively revoked. 
6.2.3 Digital Library Authorisation Model 
As pointed out in Bertino et al's paper [Bertino et al 2002], a Digital Library (DL) 
is characterised by a dynamic user population, often making accesses from remote 
locations, and by an extraordinary large amount of information. The traditional 
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access matrix model is thus inadequate to handle the access control requirements in a 
DL system. The Digital Library Authorisation Model (DLAM) was developed by the 
author for the specification and enforcement of access rights applicable to the Digital 
Library (DL) environment. 
DLAM consists of four components: subjects, objects, privileges and 
authorization, which roughly correspond to the concept of domains, objects, 
privileges and the access matrix entries in the traditional model. However, DLAM is 
more flexible and powerful in that it provides additional formal means to specify each 
of these to capture the access policy of the DL. 
In case of the subjects, DLAM associate a number of DL specific roles (eg 
subscriber, author, co-ordinator, reviewer) and attributes to each user (eg name of the 
user, area of interest of a subscriber). 
The content of a DL object is represented in DLAM by associating with it one or 
more "concepts". "Concepts" are organised hierarchically into an ontology, with the 
more general one at a higher level of the concept tree. 
An authorisation consists of 
• subject specification which may either be the name of the user or a 
credential specification which is an expression of conditions based on the 
roles and/or attributes associated with the subjects. As such, we can say the 
DLAM extend the RBAC role specification to provide a more flexible 
means to specify the access rules. 
• Object specification which may either be the name of the DL object or a 
entity specification, which is an expression of conditions based on the 
"concepts" associated with the objects. 
• Privilege granted by the authorization 
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• Sign of the authorization: whether the privilege is granted or no. 
DLAM also provides the rules for authorization propagation along the concept 
hierarchy and exception management to resolve conflicting authorization. 
Similarly to the other existing models, DLAM cannot address the need of a 
webservice based system to cater for the access right based on combination of 
environment factors including physical means of access, identity of the user and 
identify of consumer. In addition, DLAM is designed as a monolithic access control 
architecture, and thus cannot be directly applied in the eGovernment situation where 
both local and global level of access controls are required. 
Nevertheless, there is a lot of similarities between the access control environment 
of a DL and the webservices based eGovernment systems and there are many DLAM 
ideas that are useful in an eGovernment webservice access control model. In our 
proposed model, we have borrowed a lot of ideas from DLAM: 
• use of a subject category to support the legislation based policy, which is 
based on DLAM's object concept. However, we have decided not to group 
the legal subjects hierarchically; 
• support of the sign in the access rule is based on the same concept in the 
DLAM authorization 
• provision of resolution rules to resolve conflicting authorisation is also 
based on the same concept in DLAM. 
6.3 Recent Works 
Recently, a number of access control models have been developed to address the 
various requirements of distributed processing over the Internet. These include Type 
Enforcement, Multiple-policy Schematic Protection (MSP), Typed Access Matrix 
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(TAM) model and Dynamically Typed Access (DTAC) models. While these have 
shown potential for applicability in the eGovernment environment, they are still in the 
initial phases of development [Joshi et al 2002]. 
6.4 Limitations of the Models 
As we have seen, while existing models does provide a workable mechanism to 
address the access control requirements of the traditional information systems, they 
are inadequate for the webservice based eGovernment environment. 
The main problem with the models is that they are based on the simple user 
concept in the traditional time-sharing system, and the access control decision can be 
made based on a single user party associated with the access request. An access to a 
webservice, on the other hand, can be associated with more than one parties and a 
webservice access control infrastructure must therefore be able to accommodate 
access policies based on combination of user and consumer identity. For example, if 
a webservice to update the vehicle record of the transport department provided to the 
police department to report vehicle theft, an access to the webservice should be 
accepted when the consumer is from the police department and the user is the owner 
of the vehicle. All the existing models failed to accommodate this access control 
requirement. 
In addition, the models we have reviewed are non-domain specific ones. As 
general solutions to the access control problems, these models do not cater well to 
some of the eGovernment specific situations: 
• There are a lot of eGovernment services to provide access to citizen data. 
For these services, each citizen should be authorized to access his/own data 
only. However, citizen level access right cannot be conveniently supported 
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in these models and must be implemented within the webservice which 
implies that the webservice cannot be developed in a "access policy neutral" 
manner. 
• As we have seen, infrastructure or administration G2G webservices should 
be accessible by all consumer systems connected to the government intranet. 
Similarly, internal services provided to support integration of systems in the 
same government department should allow access from consumer systems 
via the department LAN. These access means based access right is not 
supported directly in the existing models and thus must be done indirectly 
on a consumer by consumer basis. This requires, a separate access rule for 
each government or internal consumer, which is a tedious and inefficient 
way to specify the right. 
• There is no provision for legal subject based authorisation. Legislation 
based access policy cannot be expressed directly in the model and must be 
translated into object (webservice) access rights. 
To provide a mechanism that work for webservice, and to provide a solution that 
better addresses the need for eGovernment access control, we propose a flexible 
access control framework which is composed of two key components: the webservice 
specific access control and the subject based access control. 
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7 Proposed Approach 
111 order to meet the requirements for a secured webservices based eGovernment 
system, we propose that a two level access control mechanism can be used. We 
propose a scheme based on the access model developed by Bertino et al [Bertino et al 
2002]. The original model is to address digital libraries access rights and we have 
made enhancements to apply to the webservice and provide the two level access 
control. 
The mechanism is flexible and powerful enough to accommodate the access right 
rules for all types of internal, inter-department and public eGovernment webservices 
as it is able to: 
• accommodate the access right rules for internal, inter-department and public 
eGovernment webservices; 
• enable the eGovernment webservices to be developed in a "policy neutral" 
manner; 
• accommodate access right rules based on physical means of access; 
• accommodate access right rules based on the combination of the end-user 
and consumer identity and extensible to cover the chained webservice 
model with multiple consumers; 
• support both administration and legislation based access policy. 
The proposed two level access control mechanism consists of two key 
components: 
• the webservice specific access control and; 
• the subject based access control. 
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We will first examine each of the two access right control components. We will 
then explain how these access rights can be applied to the webservices based 
eGovernment environment. 
7.1 WebService Specific Access Control 
The first level of access rights in the mechanism are those rights associated with 
individual eGovernment webservices. These access rights correspond to the 
administration based access policy which, as we have demonstrated, are all 
webservice specific. This is the level of access control that should be implemented 
within the domain of the webservice provider. 
7.1.1 WebService Access Rules 
The webservice specific access rights are expressed by webservice access rules. 
Specifically, each rule consists of the following elements: 
• a user specification USER, which specifies the end user that the access rule 
applies. This may be the digital identification of a specific citizen or a 
government staff member, * ANONYMOUS (anonymous access), 
*CITIZEN (any citizen with a valid identification). Note that there is a 
difference between the anonymous and "any citizen" right when only access 
to the individual data subject is granted (see below). In this case, the former 
specifies unrestricted rights to use the webservice, while the later implicitly 
specifies that the right granted is limited to using of the webservice to 
access the citizen data related to the end user. As such, * CITIZEN should 
only be applied to webservices that involved access to personal data. 
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• a consumer specification CONSUMER, which specifies the webservice 
consumer that the rule applies. This may be the digital identification of a 
specific government department or a private organization, *ANONYMOUS 
(anonymous access), * GOVERNMENT (access from the government 
intranet), *LOCAL (access from the provider's LAN). The last two special 
value is to provide for specification of access right based on the physical 
means of access. 
• a M'ebservice specification fVS, which specifies the government webservice 
governed by the rule. It is assumed that there is a naming system in place in 
each eGovernment domain to provide a unique identification for each 
individual government webservice within the domain. 
• the sign of the access right, that is whether the right to access the 
webservice is granted (right to access any data subject via the 
webservice) “+/，(right to access the user's data only via the webservice); 
or not “-，，. 
We can denote a webservice access rule in the form o f � U S E R , CONSUMER, 
fVS, "+/-" >. The following examples illustrate the working of the webservice access 
rule: 
• <*citizen, ^anonymous, ws-l, +/>: a request to access the webservice ws-I 
from any consumers will be accepted. If m^s-1 requires access to personal 
data, the access right is limited to the data of the requesting citizen. This is 
an example of a public government webservice which requires citizen level 
access right. 
• <*cmonymous, ^governments M^S-2, +A>: a request to access the webservice 
ws-2 from any consumers connected to the provider of ws-2 via the 
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government intranet will be accepted. This is an example of a G2G 
infrastructure webservice not involving citizen data. 
• <*anonymous, *hcal, m^s-3, +A>: a request from any user to access the 
webservice ws-3 via any consumers connected to the provider of m^s-3 via 
the local LAN will be accepted. This is an example of an internal service 
provided within a government department 
• <stqff-l, *hccd, M>S-4, +A>: a request from staff-1 to access the webservice 
ws-4 via any consumers connected to the provider of ws-4 via the local 
LAN will be accepted. If ws-4 requires access to personal data, staff-1 will 
be able to access the data of all data subject via the webservice. In this case, 
staff-1 should be a staff whose day-to-day responsibility requires access to 
the corresponding citizen data. This is an example of a webservice specific 
right granted based on the status of the user. 
• <*citizen, consumer-1, vrs’-5，+/>: a request to access the webservice 
from consumer consumer-1 will be accepted. If • - 5 requires access to 
personal data, the right granted by this rule is limited to data of the 
requesting citizen. This is an example of a government service that is to be 
embedded in the system of selected party. 
• <*anonymous, consumer-2, ws-6, ->: any request to access the webservice 
ws-6 from consumer consumer-2 will be rejected. This illustrates the use of 
the "-" sign to explicitly revoke access from a particular consumer. 
7.1.2 Authorisation Conflict Resolution 
Resolution of authorisation conflict is required when both positive ("+A" or "+1") 
and negative ("-") rights have been defined for the same access. Certainly we can 
require that all the rules specified are consistent with one another to avoid the conflict. 
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However, allowing different access rights to be specified at different levels of 
user/consumer specificity is useful when we want to provide access to a general group 
of user/consumer, with a few individuals excluded. To utilise this feature, we provide 
an authorisation resolution rule, which specifies that a specific access right always 
take precedence over a more general right. 
The rule of precedence is expressed in Table 7.1.2. To illustrate, suppose there 
are two rules: <user-l, consumer-1, ws-1, -> a n d � ^ c i t i z e n , consumer-1, +A>, 
both apply to an access request to ws-1 made by user-1 via consumer-1. Here, the 
first rule is of priority 1 (specific user and consumer) while the second rule is of 
priority 2 (*CITIZEN and specific consumer). As such, the first rule take precedence 
and thus access will be rejected on the request. In effect, this combination of rules 
provides access of the webservice to all citizens via consumer-1 except user-1. 
Without the authorization conflict resolution rule, this situation would require a large 
number of access rules to explicitly grant the right to all citizen users individually 
except user-1. 
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Priority User Consumer 
1 A specific user A specific consumer 
(most specific) 
2 * CITIZEN A specific consumer 
3 * ANONYMOUS A specific consumer 
4 A specific user *GOVERNMENT/*LOCAL 
5 * CITIZEN *GOVERNMENT/*LOCAL 
6 *ANONYMOUS * GOVERNMENT 严 LOCAL 
7 A specific user ^ANONYMOUS 
8 ^CITIZEN * ANONYMOUS 
9 *ANONYMOUS ^ANONYMOUS 
(least specific) 
Table 7.1.2: Priority of access rules based on the specificity of the user/consumer 
7.2 Subject Based Access Control 
The second level of access rights in the mechanism are those rights associated 
with webservice subjects. These access rights correspond to the legislation based 
access policy, which is based on the legal subjects and specifies who can access these 
subjects. Subject based access control is to be operated over the individual 
government departments and this is the level of access control that should be 
implemented at a global level. 
7.2.1 Subject Category 
The subject category is a repository of all the legal subjects which are the objects 
of access rights. The category should contain an entry for each legal subject with both 
the proper legal term and its source, which specifies the piece of legislature which is 
the source of the legal term. The source is included as reference information to the 
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legal subject and usually it should be a pointer to the relevant interpretation section in 
the corresponding legislature. Inclusion of this reference provides a means to retrieve 
the legal interpretation of the subject when there are questions to the details of the 
underlying access policy later. 
The subject category should provide a unique identification for each subject. 
The subject ID will be used in the subject access rules to associate the access rights to 
the subject. 
The subject category is similar to the object concept structure in the model of 
Bertino et al [Bertino et al 2002] and provides the same functionality in our model. 
The major difference in our model is that we have adopted a simple set structure for 
the legal subjects instead of a hierarchy structure. While a hierarchy structure may 
provide a more powerful mechanism to express the access right, we believe that more 
research in the area of the legal subjects is required to conclude whether this is 
appropriate and feasible. 
7.2.2 Subject Access Rules 
The subject based access rights are expressed by subject access rules. 
Specifically, each rule consists of the following elements: 
• a user specification USER, which specifies the end user that the access rule 
applies. The use and interpretation of this element is the same as in the 
webservice access rule except that only two values are allowed: 
•ANONYMOUS (anonymous access) or ^CITIZEN (any citizen with a 
valid identification). 
• a consumer specification CONSUMER, which specifies the webservice 
consumer that the rule applies. Same as in the webservice access rule. 
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• a subject specification SUBJECT, which specifies the legal subject 
webservice governed by the rule. This should contain the unique ID of 
legal subject that can link up with the subject category. 
• a privilege specification PRIVILEGE, which specifies privilege granted or 
revoked by this rule. This may be *READ (read privilege) or *UPDATE 
(update privilege, which implies the *READ privilege). 
• a source specification SOURCE, which specifies the legal source of the rule. 
This should contain a reference to the relevant piece of legislature which is 
the basis of the access right. 
• a priority specification PRORITY, which optionally provides a priority 
number of the rules which can be used to resolve conflicting rules. This 
applies only to legal system which provides a hierarchical legislation 
structure (for example, the US Constitution takes precedence over all other 
forms of law in the state). 
• the sign of the access right, that is whether the right to access the 
webservice is granted (right to access any data subject via the 
webservice) “+/’ (right to access the user's data only via the webservice); 
or not “-，，. 
We can denote a subject access rule in the form o f � U S E R , CONSUMER, 
SUBJECT, PRIVILEGE, SOURCE, PRIORITY’ “+/-” >. The following examples 
(which are based on the law of Hong Kong) illustrate the working of the subject 
access rule: 
• anonymous, *anonymous, “Land Registry’’, "^read, “Land Registration 
Regulations s4'\ 1, +A>: specifies that any user can request via any 
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consumer systems to webservices requiring read-only access to the Land 
Registry information.; 
• �"^citizen, "^anonymous, “personal data’’, "^update, ''Personal Data (Privacy) 
Ordinance s22'\ 7, +/> specifies that any user can request via any consumer 
systems to webservices that will update his/her own personal data.; 
• anonymous, “Inland Revenue Department”, “tax related information 
data”，*read’ “Inland Revenue Ordinance s5r\ 1, +A> specifies that 
request will be accepted via the Inland Revenue Department's system to 
webservices requiring read-only access to the "tax related information data". 
7.2.3 WebService Registration 
To apply the subject based access right to a webservice, we need to associate the 
webservice with the subject(s) representing the security subjects (the business 
service/information resources) it encapsulates. This can be done by registering the 
webservice in the subject category, effectively mapping the webservice to the 
applicable subject(s). Note that the registration can be done locally within the 
provider's domain and a global registration database is not required. 
A registration entry for a webservice should contain the following: 
• the webservice to register; 
• the subject id of the subject that the webservice should be associated with; 
• the privilege of the subject that is required to access the webservice, this can 
be *READ (read privilege) or *UPDATE (update privilege). 
Once the registration is done, the subject based access control mechanism 
operates by referring to the access rules of all the subject(s) associated with the 
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webservice. A request to access the webservice should be accepted if the necessary 
privilege on the associated subject has been granted by one of the rules in effect. 
It is possible that a webservice is registered under more than one subjects. This 
would happen when the security subjects are governed by more than one pieces of 
legislation, or when the webservice encapsulates more than one security subjects. In 
this case, the access test must be performed for all the associated subjects and a 
request should be accepted if the necessary privileges required for all the subjects are 
granted. 
7.2.4 Authorisation Conflict Resolution 
Similar to the webservice access rules, it is possible that both positive or 
.‘‘+/，）and negative (“-“）rights are defined for the same access in the subject based 
access control. This may reflect the need to define a general access rule 
supplemented by a few exceptions, as we have seen in the webservice access control 
example. However, this may also be resulted from more than one sources of access 
policy in force for the same legal subject. In each case, we need a similar schema to 
resolve the conflicts in authorisation. 
When there is a conflict between two rules applying to the same subject, we will 
first resolve the conflict by the priority of the rule. The rule with the higher priority 
will take precedence. If both rules are of the same priority (or no priority is specified), 
the "specific over general" rule can be applied, although some modification on the 
rule of precedence is required to take into account the different values supported by 
the subject based access rules. The rules are expressed in Table 7.2.4: 
Priority User Consumer 
1 * CITIZEN A specific consumer 
(most specific) 
2 *ANONYMOUS A specific consumer 
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3 I* CITIZEN |*GOVERNMENT/*LOCAL 
4 ^ANONYMOUS *GOVERNMENT/*LOCAL 
5 *CITIZEN ^ANONYMOUS 
6 ^ANONYMOUS ^ANONYMOUS 
(least specific) 
Table 7.2.4: Priority of access rules for subject based rule 
If all the above fail to resolve the conflict, the mechanism should reject the 
access and report the case as an exception (this is only possible when there is a 
conflict between different legislation provisions). This is the safe approach as the 
user can always request the business service with an alternative means. 
7.3 The WebServices 
The proposed mechanism does not require a government webservice to be aware 
of the access control policy that will be applied. The infrastructure service provided 
by the mechanism will decide whether a particular request to access the webservice 
should be accepted or not. Accepted requests will be routed to the webservice, while 
unauthorized requests will be rejected right away. 
7.4 Combining Two Level Access Control 
In general the two levels of access control works independently. The webservice 
access rules work in a local context within the webservice provider's domain. The 
subject access rules work across the government and are controlled centrally. The 
webservice provider's role is restricted to the registration of the webservice. 
It is possible that both types of access rights apply to the same webservice. Our 
rule is that the webservice access rules should always be consulted first. If the rules 
cannot determine whether an access request should be accepted or not, the subject 
rules can then be consulted. This is based on the assumption that the webservice 
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provider should take into account of all the relevant facts when the administration 
based (webservice specific) access policy is worked out and thus the rule should take 
precedence over the more general legislation based rights. 
An exception will occur if both level of access control cannot determine whether 
a request should be accepted. In this case, the request should be rejected. This is 
actually an arbitrary decision based on the fact that the user can always request the 
business service with an alternative means. 
7.5 Application to Chained WebService Request 
Both the webservice and subject access rules only accommodate one consumer 
party. As a result, the rules cannot be applied directly in the more complicated 
situation when a service is requested as a result of a chain of webservice executions. 
We have argued that we should view such access request as made jointly by the 
owner systems of the webservices on the chain preceding the webservice. For the 
purpose of access control, we can view these requests as made with multiple 
consumers and we should combine the access rights of all the consumer systems. 
Along these lines, it is possible to extend the proposed mechanism to cover the 
chained webservice requests. 
For the webservice access rights, we can first determine whether the request of a 
chained request should be accepted based on the identity of each consumer. To 
combine the access rights, the request should be accepted if any consumer has got the 
right to access the service. 
Similar arrangement can be applied to the subject based rights. Here the schema 
should however work on the subject level. We should determine whether the required 
privilege on a subject is granted based on the identity of each consumer. If the 
privilege has been granted to any of the consumers in the request, it should be treated 
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as granted. As such, when a webservice requires privileges to several security 
subjects, it is possible to access the webservice with a request made jointly by a group 
of consumers if their access rights add up to the required privileges, even though 
individually neither of them can access the webservice. 
7.6 Comparison with the Existing Access Control Models 
As we have mentioned in section 6.4，the existing access control models cannot 
address the requirement of eGovernment webservice as they fail to support access 
rules based on combination of user and consumer identity. 
In the proposed system, both a user specification and a consumer specification 
are in place in the access rules. This allows specification of rules based on 
combination of user and consumer identity and makes the system adequate to address 
the webservice requirements. 
In contrast to the existing models, the propose system also caters better to the 
eGovernment access control infrastructure with support for the following domain-
specific requirements: 
• citizen level access right can be specified directly with the sign of “+1”； 
• special consumer specification values * LOCAL and * GOVERNMENT are 
provided to express access rules based on physical means of access; 
• the subject based access control component is in place to support legislation 
based access policy. 
A more comprehensive evaluation of the proposed model is provided in section 9. 
In particular, application scenarios which illustrate the detailed working of the 
above in the proposed system can be found in section 9.1. 
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8 An Implementation Reference Model 
8.1 Some Practical Issues 
Before we go into details of our implementation model, it is worthwhile to bring 
out a few practical issues related to the implementation of a secured webservice 
infrastructure. They are discussed in the following subsections: 
• Citizen privacy 
• Trust between eGovernment systems 
• Authentication 
8.1.1 Citizen Privacy 
We have argued that protection of citizen's personal information privacy is one 
of the eGovernment security requirements. Most legal systems have relevant 
legislation eg the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance of Hong Kong, to implement the 
protection of citizen data privacy which should form part of the legislation based 
access policy to govern the necessary access control to achieve the required protection. 
We have also mentioned that the request for a service made by a citizen should 
only be made known to the service provider and not to other parties, unless the 
disclosure of this information is explicitly allowed by the citizen. This is to safeguard 
the citizen from undesirable data surveillance based on the access pattern collected 
without his/her consent. 
In terms of the eGovernment webservice access control, this places a more subtle 
but less obvious requirements: the mechanism should not require the disclosure of the 
citizen service requestor's identity at a global level, beyond the service provider's 
domain. For example, a global access control engine that requires the submission of 
the citizen's identity to determine when an access should be granted is unacceptable. 
This is because that in such case the global engine will be able to collect the pattern of 
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all accesses made by the citizen even different electronic identities are provided to the 
citizen, and is thus a clear violation of the above privacy requirement. This in effect 
requires a strong separation of the authentication mechanism with the access control 
decision and is an important constraint to the mechanism that can be applied. We will 
see how the two level access control based access control mechanism can be 
employed to meet this need. 
8.1.2 Trust between eGovernment Systems 
It is a general design principle of a security system that the reliance of trust 
between different systems should be minimized. The rationale behind is that any 
compromise in one system will affect the integrity of all systems that trust it. The 
avoidance of all kinds of trust in a system may not be practical. As demonstrated by 
Yahalom et al [Yahalom et al 1993], in reality most of the security algorithms 
(including Keroberos, SPX and SELANE) employ some degree of trust. 
We argue that the same should apply to the task of end-user authentication when 
the access right policy of the webservice requires a decision based on the identity of 
the end-user, who makes the request via a consumer running on another government 
department. In many cases, the service provider is willing to trust the consumer 
department if it is relied on to deliver the service to the citizen. As such, the 
presentation of the citizen's digital identity by the consumer process is sufficient to 
support the fact that the request is made on behalf of that citizen. This will enable the 
consumer department's staff to choose the most appropriate means to decide the 
identity of the citizen, ranging from physical presence to the use of a department 
maintained user password and we have argued that this trust arrangement provides the 
greatest flexibility to the end-user. 
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The trust arrangement between government bodies is not part of the access 
policy: it only deals with how the access rule can be implemented. However, it is 
desirable for the access control mechanism to accommodate the arrangements to 
enable easy configuration of webservices. We suggest that the trust arrangements can 
be handled as part of the administration based access policy. This can be done by 
granting webservice specific access right to the trusted government department(s) just 
based on the department's identity. In effect, the authentication of the citizen is not 
required for the trusted department to gain access to the webservice. 
If the webservice is access by another department not in the trusted list, it will 
not be covered by the relaxed webservice specific access right and an authenticated 
citizen's identity will be required based on the prescribed access policy. 
8.1.3 Authentication 
The access control is to determine who can access a webservice and this requires 
the identification of the consumer and/or the end-user requesting the service. 
Although the authentication model is separate with the access right model, the 
authentication mechanism is an important part of the security model and some 
discussion of it is necessary to complete the whole picture of access control 
mechanism. 
As we have mentioned, one of the challenges for security implementation in 
eGovernment systems is the need to provide the citizen with choices over how much 
of the data he or she is willing to provide, in exchange for a more powerful and 
efficient service. This implies that the authentication mechanism must be feasible to 
allow different kind of digital identities. 
For example, to provide a single signon (SSO) functionality to different 
webservices across the eGovernment, the authentication system must support a global 
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identity and a common authentication entity (the entity may consist of multiple 
distributed servers but each must be linked to share a common identity database). 
Users opted to enjoy the SSO functionality will have their service request logged by 
the common authentication mechanism. As such, the more privacy concerned citizen 
may choose to have a separate identity with each government department (service 
provider) to avoid going through the global authentication process. In this way, the 
citizen can be more certain that his/her service request will not be known to other 
parties outside to the service provider. The use of digital identities from different 
government domains is thus a key requirement. 
As different government departments are likely to have their legacy identity 
systems, the requirement for multiple identity domains necessitates the support of 
multiple protocols (eg Kerberos tickets, PIN, eCertificate based electronic signature, 
etc), according to the identity domain adopted by the citizen in the webservice access. 
We have discussed the issue of trust between the consumer and the service 
provider in a webservice request made on behalf of a citizen. Trust between the client 
and the consumer is however another issue that we need to examine in terms of the 
authentication process. Authentication can be straightforward if there is a trusted 
relationship between the citizen and the consumer (for example, when the consumer is 
a government department) as the citizen can supply the relevant PIN or private key to 
produce the necessary credential to the provider through the consumer. However, if 
such relationship cannot be established, as in the case when the consumer is from the 
private sector, a more supplicated arrangement will be necessary. One of the 
possibility is to use a signed codelet (which is a feature supported by most common 
internet browsers) from a trusted party (eg the government) which can be downloaded 
on request to produce the credential from the citizen's password or private key. This 
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scheme works because the citizen can trust that the information supplied to the 
codelet will not be disclosed to the consumer. 
Lastly, to support the access control requirements we just gone through, it is not 
sufficient for the authentication system just to provide the identity of the end-user. To 
support physical access based policy, the mechanism must also be able to provide the 
physical access information of the request, ie whether the request is coming from the 
provider's LAN, the government intranet, or the internet, as well as anonymous 
access which should be accepted by the access policy of the public information 
enquiry webservices. 
8.2 System Architecture 
To implement the two level access control model, a typical system architecture 
consists of the following: 
• eGovernment webservices gateway 
• authentication engine 
• access control database 
• access control decision engine. 
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Fieure 8.2 : Proposed Svstem Architecture 
8.2.1 eGovernment WebServices Gateway 
To protect the eGovernment webservice resources, access to the webservices 
should be restricted to well-defined access points. This can be achieved by 
eGovernment webservices gateways which provide connection to the webservice 
from different network environments. A different gateway can be set up for access 
via the local LAN, the government intranet and the Internet. 
For public service, consumer systems will able to submit the webservice request 
to the appropriate Internet webservice gateway via the Internet. Similarly, 
government consumer systems can access the eGovernment webservices via the 
government intranet gateway. For internal service, consumer systems connected to 
the webservice provider on the same LAN will request the webservice via the LAN 
gateway. 
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In each gateway, additional protection hardware and software (eg firework) can 
be added appropriate to the corresponding network environment. 
8.2.2 Authentication Engine 
The request for a webservice may contain the digital identification of the user 
and/or consumer. The access control decision will be made based on the identity of 
the user/consumer corresponding to the digital identification. 
It is the responsibility of the authentication engines to provide and prove the 
identity of the user/consumer based on the digital identification provided. As we have 
seen, there is a need to support multiple identity domains, both global and local ones 
managed by different departments. We have assumed that an authorization engine 
will be available for each identity domain. The security infrastructure of provider 
should be able to locate and access the proper authorization engine corresponding to 
the digital identifications. 
8.2.3 Access Control Database 
To implement the access control models, a number of databases should be 
maintained. 
Ill the local level, ie specific to the service provider, a database storing the 
webservice access rules for all the local webservices is required. This will be 
consulted to determine locally whether a request should be accepted based on the 
webservice access rights. 
In addition, the local database will also include the registration information of 
the local webservices. To invoke the subject based access control decision, this 
“ Page 66 
database provides information of the subjects associated with the webservice in 
question, which will be required to retrieve the appropriate subject access rules. 
At the global level, a database storing the subject access rules will be maintained. 
8.2.4 Access Control Decision Engine 
To handle the two levels of access control independently, two access control 
decision engines will be required. The local access control engine will make decision 
based on the webservice access rules. A subject access control engine which runs 
outside the provider's domain will be responsible to make decision based on the 
subject rules. 
In both cases, the engine should decide not only whether a webservice request 
should be accepted. It also has to determine whether the access right granted is based 
on a data subject specific access rule (eg a rule with the "+/" sign). If this is the case, 
the webservice request should be examined to check that the data subject accessed is 
that of the requesting citizen. 
An important feature of the global engine is that the query should be based on 
generic citizen identity (^CITIZEN or *ANONYMOUS) and the legal subject. The 
use of generic citizen identity ensure that access request information of a citizen will 
not be disclosed outside the service provider's domain. This is possible because the 
subject access rules only refer to generic user identify. Also, use of legal subjects in 
the access control query instead of the webservice provides another privacy protection 
as the global engine will not have any knowledge of the specific service the citizen is 
requesting. 
8.2.5 A Working Scenario 
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To illustrate how the different architecture components would work together, a 
working scenario to make the access control decision for a webservice request is 
provided. The step number referred in the example corresponds to the same number 
ill Figure 8.2. 
1. The user invokes a web-based application on the consumer's system. The 
application requires the service of an eGovernment webservice. 
2. The consumer system prepares the necessary webservice request, with the 
digital identities as required by the webservice. The request is submitted to 
the appropriate gateway, depending on the type of consumer. 
3. The gateway routes the webservice requests to the appropriate provider, 
which is intercepted by the security handler of the provider's webservice 
engine. 
4. The security handler locates and invokes the appropriate authentication 
engine to use based on the digital identity. The request will be rejected if 
authentication fails. This step may be skipped if the request is an 
anonymous one. 
5. The local access control decision engine will be consulted to see whether 
the request should be accepted. The engine will make use of the local 
access control database to retrieve the rules applicable to the requested 
webservice. If the access is based on an access rule with specific data 
subject (ie a "+/" rule), the webservice request will be examined to check 
that the data subject accessed is that of the requesting citizen. If a decision 
can be made, the request will either be routed to the appropriate webservice 
(step 7) or rejected right away. 
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6. If a decision cannot be made within the provider's domain, the subject(s) 
associated with the requested webservice will be retrieved from the local 
access control database and the global access control decision engine will 
be consulted to make a decision. If the access is based on an access rule 
with specific data subject (ie a “+/, rule), the webservice request will be 
examined to check that the data subject accessed is that of the requesting 
citizen. The request will be rejected according to the result of the decision. 
7. The request will be passed to the corresponding webservice. 
8.3 Implementation 
We have implemented a prototype system on top of Apache Axis using the Java 
platform. The developed system is largely according to the architecture described in 
Section 8.2, with the following simplifications: 
• To reduce the demand on hardware, the three WebService Gateways (local, 
government and internet) are simulated instead of implemented physically. 
This is achieved by setting of the access medium (ie LAN, government 
intranet or Internet) by our webservice client based on a user input 
parameter. 
• The authentication engines have not been implemented. This is to simplify 
the implementation as our focus is mainly on the access control. 
• The extension to handle chained webservice requests as described in 
Section 7.5 is not implemented. 
Figure 8.3A shows a screenshot of the system when a request is prepared for a 
webservice invocation. A webservice request is prepared based on the following 
input: 
• user domain and id 
“ “ Page 69 
• consumer domain and id 
• access medium (which simulates the use of different webservice gateway, 
as mentioned above) 
• webservice parameters 
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Figure 8.3A: A WebService Request 
The use of the fields "user domain" and ‘‘consumer domain，，is to support digital 
identities from different government domains as it provides the information for the 
system to choose the appropriate authentication engine to validate the digital 
identification. 
Once all the information has been input into the system, a SOAP request 
message will be generated and sent to the webservice provider. The access control 
information (user，consumer and medium type) is incorporated in a header element 
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compatible with the WS-Security [Atkinson et at 2002] standard. The following is an 
example of a header generated: 
<soapenv:Header> 
<wsse:Security soapenv:actor="" soapenv:mustUnderstand="0" 
xmlns:wsse='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/0 












On the server side, the security handler (Figure 8.2) is implemented via a SOAP 
Message Handler which is defined by the JAX-RPC standard. With Apache Axis, the 
access control can be "plugged-in" to the eGovernment webservice by incorporating 
the handler information in the Web Service Deployment Descriptor (WSDD) for the 
published webservice. 
The implemented security handler performs the following functions: 
• intercept the SOAP request message before the request is processed by the 
provider 
• extract the access control information from the WS-Security header 
• check the local webservice based access control database for access right 
• consult the Global Access Control Engine (Figure 8.2) for subject based 
access right, if necessary 
• check that the data subject accessed is that of the user, in case the access 
right is “+厂 ( th i s is done by inspecting the appropriate element of the 
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SOAP body for the request parameter that representing the data subject 
based to the provider) 
• reject the request if the access right is not granted, or a data subject other 
than the requesting user is tried to be accessed without a "+^4" right 
• pass the request to the provider if the request is authorized 
Figure 8.3B shows a screenshot when a request with proper authorization has 
been processed. The screen shows the response SOAP message returned by the 
webservice provider. 
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Figure 8.3B: A Successful Request 
The rejection message from the security handler will be shown if the request is 
not authorized, as illustrated in Figure 8.3C. 
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Figure 8.3C: An Unauthorised Request 
The Global Access Control Engine is implemented as a separate Java function, 
which can either be invoked locally as a Java method, or consumed as a published 
Apache Axis webservice. 
Both the local and and global access control databases are maintained as xml 
files, which are loaded by the local security handler and Global Engine respectively 
during each invocation. 
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9 Evaluation of the Proposed Mechanism 
Table 9 summaries the key requirements and how the proposed mechanism can 
meet each requirement: 
Requireme^ How to achieve 
To enable the eGovernment webservices The scheme does not require a 
to be developed in a "policy neutral" government webservice to be aware 
manner of the access control policy that will 
be applied. 
To accommodate access right rules The access rules support rights based 
based on physical means of access. on means of access like * LOCAL, 
^GOVERNMENT. 
To accommodate access right rules The access rules contain specific 
based on the combination of the end- components to express rights based on 
user and consumer identity and both the end user and consumer 
extensible to cover the chained identify, 
webservice model with multiple 
consumers 
To support both administration and The administration and legislation 
legislation based access policy based policy are accommodated in the 
webservice and subject based access 
control respectively. 
Table 9: Qualitative Evaluation of the Two Level Access Control Model 
Based on our research, no existing access models we are aware can meet all the 
above requirements. In addition, an implementation based on our reference model 
will be able to meet the following citizen privacy requirements: 
• the access request information of a citizen will not be disclosed outside the 
service provider's domain 
• a citizen can use different types of digital identities to request for 
eGovernment webservice, ranging from a global identity across all 
government departments to those provided by individual departments on a 
local level. 
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9.1 Application Scenarios 
The following provides examples of typical access control scenarios in the 
government environment and how the proposed mechanism can address them. This is 
to illustrate how our proposed mechanism can meet the various eGovernment 
requirements. 
9.1.1 Citizen Level Access Right 
Probable the most common type of eGovernment information services are those 
providing enquiry and/or update of a citizen's data record kept by the government 
department. Some of the examples are: 
• enquiry of the citizen's driving license record 
• update/correction of the citizen's address information 
• submission of information (eg tax return) 
The access control requirement for these webservices is simple: each citizen 
should be authorized to access his/her own data only. 
The proposed mechanism offers a handy way to support this citizen level access 
need, as the sign field of the access rule supports value of ‘‘+/，，which specifies that 
the access to the webservice is limited to the data of the requesting user. 
In comparison, none of the access control mechanisms we have reviewed 
supports this type of access right. The user level access right can thus only be 
implemented within the services, which implies that the webservices cannot be 
developed in a "policy neutral" manner. 
The following are examples of how the required access right can be defined 
using the webservice based access rules: 
• <*cUizen’ ^government, M>S, + / � p r o v i d e s access of the webservice to all 
user who can provide a valid digital id, via the government intranet 
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• <*citizen, "^anonymous, +/> provides access of the webservice to all 
user who can provide a valid digital id, via any consumer. 
The use of subject based access rules to implement user level access right is 
similar and thus not repeated. 
9.1.2 Access Means Based Authorisation 
Another common type of services are those infrastructure or administration 
related G2G webservices, which provided infrastructure service, or support inter-
department system integration. Some of the examples are: 
• timestamp service provided by the central IT centre 
• eProcurement service provided by the government central procurement 
department 
This type of services should be accessible by all the parties who are authorized to 
access the government systems, or have access to the government intranet. 
There is another type of internal services which are provided to support 
integration of systems in the same government department. Examples are: 
• submission of document to the department's electronic filing system 
• enquiry and update services to the department's operating system 
Similar to the G2G services, the access to these services should be based on the 
access means: access should be allowed via the department's local LAN. 
The proposed mechanism supports access right based on the physical means of 
access by the special value *LOCAL and *GOVERNMENT in the consumer 
specification. An access rule with a consumer specification of *LOCAL or 
*GOVERNMENT will provide access right to webservice requests coming from the 
department LAN or government intranet respectively. 
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While access means based access right can be supported in other access control 
mechanisms, it requires specification of the right on a consumer by consumer basis to 
do so. Our proposed mechanism thus provides a more compact and efficient way to 
define the right. 
The following are examples of how the access means based right can be defined 
using the webservice based access rules: 
• <*anonymoiis, '^government,慨，"h4> provides access of the webservice to 
all users on the government intranet 
• anonymous, *local’ vks", +A> provides access of the webservice to all user 
on the department LAN. 
The use of subject based access rules to implement access means based right is 
similar and thus not repeated. 
9.1.3 Access Right Based on Combination of User and Consumer Identity 
A more general type of webservice access right will require the specification of 
both the user and consumer identification. Some common examples of this type of 
webservices are: 
• G2G citizen webservice provided to a specific government department to 
support operation streamlining (eg a webservice to update the vehicle record 
of the transport department provided to the police department to report 
vehicle theft); 
• citizen webservice provided to support operations which has been 
outsourced to a third-party (eg, a webservice to update the vehicle 
examination record of the transport department should be provided to the 
third-party test center which is sub-contracted to perform the vehicle fitness 
certification for the vehicle owners); 
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As both the user and consumer specification are present in an access rule, the 
proposed mechanism supports the access right based on combination of user and 
consumer identity in a flexibile and simple manner. For example, an access rule of 
the form <*citizen, consumerid, M>S, +I> can be specified to provide access of the 
webservice to all user who can provide a valid digital identification, via the specified 
consumer's system. The access is limited to the user's data. 
On the other hand, all other access control mechanisms only allow the 
specification of a single user party in the access rule and thus cannot easily 
accommodate these type of webservices. 
9.1.4 Legislation Based Access Right 
As we have discussed, access right to the government service should have 
backup from the relevant statutory laws. This can be expressed conveniently in the 
proposed model as legal subject based access rule. The following examples (which 
are based on the law of Hong Kong) illustrate the working of the subject access rule: 
• <*anonymous, ^anonymous, *i’ead’ “Land Registry“Land Registration 
Regulations s4'\ 1’ +A> specifies the duty of opening of Land Registry to 
the public; 
• <*citizen, ^anonymous, “personal data ", "^update, “Personal Data (Privacy) 
Ordinance s2T\ 7, +/> specifies the right of a data subject to correct his/her 
personal data; 
• <*citizen, *cmonymous, “tax return”, "^update, “Inland Revenue Ordinance 
s5r\ 1, +/> specifies the right of a citizen to update his/her tax return; 
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• <*anonymous’ “Inland Revenue Department”, “tax related information 
data’’�*read, “Inland Revenue Ordinance s5r\ 1, +A> specifies the power 
of tax assessor to obtain information related to tax. 
The legislation based access right is not directly supported in other access control 
mechanisms. The only way to incorporate the rights is to translate them to explicit 
webservice rights, which can be a tedious and error-proning process and this approach 
also suffers from the subsequent maintenance problem. 
9.1.5 Joined-up Government 
Implementation of the joined-up government requires integration of services 
provided by different government departments. As an example, the application of a 
license for a restaurant in Hong Kong requires the services from a number of 
government departments including the Buildings Department, Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department and Fire Services Department. To provide a 
webservice for restaurant licensing will thus integrate the services from these 
departments. The access control of the integrated services should represent an 
aggregation of the component services. 
As the proposed mechanism supports legislation based subject access rules, the 
access rights of an integrated service can be specified by simply registering the 
webservice to all the legal subjects corresponding to the underlying services. 
To illustrate, suppose it is required to construct a composite webservice based on 
two services service J and service2. If service 1 requires read-only access to legal 
subject si and service! requires update access to legal subject s2, the following 
registration entry can be set up for the new webservice: si, *read>, s2, 
* upda te� . 
"“ P a ^ 79 
This offers a simple and powerful way to establish the access rules for new 
services, as compared to the other access control models. 
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10 Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this paper, we have examined the key requirements of the eGovernment and 
how the webservices technologies can be applied in the government domain. This 
reveals that most of the issues faced by eGovernment are about integration and inter-
connectivity. Webservices technologies, which is a tool for universal interoperability, 
is therefore a logical solution to most eGovernment problems. We have also outlined 
a webservices based eGovernment infrastructure with four different webservice 
models. To incorporate these models in the eGovernment context, an eGovernment 
architect will be able to make the following important design decisions: 
• decide the functions to be exposed as eGovernment webservices (the system 
component model); 
• decide the right access means to each eGovernment webservice (the system 
access model); 
• establish the right access policy for each eGovernment webservice and the 
appropriate security mechanisms to implement it (the security model); 
• establish appropriate mechanism for the eGovernment webservice 
transactions (the transaction model). 
We have thus provided the essential reference models for a webservice 
eGovernment framework to demonstrate how the webservices technologies can be 
applied in the government domain. 
Ill addition, we have argued that a security infrastructure implemented at the 
global level is essential to protect a webservices based eGovernment system. The 
detailed requirements of such a mechanism have been examined. Lastly, we have 
illustrated how the security infrastructure can be implemented by proposing a 
mechanism that can address all of the requirements. 
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The application of webservices technologies and in particular in the government 
domain is a relatively new subject. There are thus a lot of areas for further research. 
We would like to close this paper by pointing out a few of them. 
Firstly, on the eGovernment webservice component model, researches can be 
done to provide more details to the model. What we have done is largely on the initial 
steps to convert the legacy government systems into a service based structure and thus 
the focus should be on the extraction of the existing business functions into 
webservice components. However, once this step is largely completed, additional 
webservices can be implemented to provide new business services. Alternatively, 
new webservices can be created on top of existing ones to provide macro-services 
across government departments. Work is thus desirable to see how this can be best 
done. Some of the research topics are: Is there an optimal granularity of the 
functionalities to be provided in an eGovernment webservice? Is it desirable and how 
to employ a tiered or layered based component model to the eGovernment webservice? 
For the transaction model, we believe that once the webservice transaction 
standard is becoming mature, an infrastructure framework to support eGovernment 
webservice transaction will be required. Research in this area may result in the 
formulation of either a general or eGovernment specific framework to implement 
webservices based workflow. 
Ill this paper, we have identified the legislation based access policy as an 
important source of eGovernment access policy and we have proposed a simple 
structure to accommodate the corresponding access rights. We have not attempted to 
prove that this is the best approach to capture the legislation based rights. It remains 
an open question whether a more supplicated structure (eg a tree or directed graph 
structure) can capture the legal subject more effectively, which result in a better 
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access control mechanism. In particular, whether such an alternative approach can 
make it more feasible to capture the policy into the system automatically. 
We have argued throughout the paper that interoperability is a key eGovernment 
issue which can be addressed with a webservices based structure. However, a number 
of recent events indicate a trend of much more and closer cooperation among 
governments of different countries. These include, for example, the formation of the 
European Union and the joint effort to fight against terrorism and more recently, the 
SARS disease. We speculate that this may in time call for more integration of the 
systems between governments to achieve the necessary coordination of the efforts. It 
is thus a challenging but interesting question to see whether and how the 
eGovernment webservices framework can be extended to accommodate the level 
interoperability beyond a single government. 
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